Showing posts with label banking malware. Show all posts
Showing posts with label banking malware. Show all posts

Saturday, September 22, 2018

BackSwap Returns


BackSwap Returns
Charles Parker, II
>_

The attackers and malware coders have a focus. These persons are looking for data to steal and sell or manipulate. One area which continues to grow in popularity are trojans coded to steal the user’s banking credentials. With this area of expertise, there isn’t merely more of the banking trojans, but adding a nuance to this.
The subject malware is BackSwap. Historically this has been successful in compromising targets. The updated version has been targeting Polish users and banks. At this junction, the primary targets have been users at PKO BP (Bank Polski), mBank, and ING.
Prior Versions
The prior version, while exemplary in its own right, utilized a complex process involving injection methods. The malware kept track of browsing activities. Banking malware, historically, used to inject itself into the browser’s process address space. The next step would be for the malware to hook itself into the browser-specific function. At this point, the malware would modify the traffic.
Update
Naturally, the malware was detected and the signature was placed within the AV. This lowered its overall impact on the targets, in that there were fewer successful attacks and compromises.
The improved version implemented a simple method to bypass the browser detection. This version began to be used and noted in the wild in March 2018. This malware curiously was also being revised nearly daily.
The transportation for the malware is also pertinent. For a successful campaign, the malware has to be forwarded in some manner to the targets. This path has to lull the target into clicking and downloading the malware. In this case, the malware was transported to the user via an email. This process was simple, concise, and mundane. This would have not raised a red flag. The malware itself used a heavily obfuscated JavaScript downloader (Nemucod). The malware, to assist the target in deciding to open and thus install it, was delivered and labelled as an updated version of genuine, authentic apps. The malware was launched within the initialization process of the application. This was somewhat stealthy in that the user was tricked into believing they had clicked on the true app. This feature also made the malware difficult to detect in the browser and by AV.
The malware looks for when the user is connecting to a bank’s website. The malware uses a specific script for each bank’s website. The recent malware version has been coded to initiate a wire transfer request from the target’s account. To make the theft less obvious and to ease processing, the attackers insert their account number in the form. As this is processed, the funds are wired out to the attacker’s bank account. As this is processed, the funds are wired out to the attacker’s bank account. As this appears the target is sending the money and there is not a hint this is not voluntary, this bypasses any additional authentication. The amounts stolen have varied from $10K-$20k (approximately $2,800-$5,600).
To avoid issues much like this, there needs to be training for the users focus on awareness, and the point of they don’t have to click on everything. The user being aware of potential phishing attacks is better able to recognize these and not become a victim.


Resources
Arghire, I. (2018, May 29). BackSwap trojan uses new browser monitoring and injection techniques. Retrieved from https://www.securityweek.com/backswap-trojan-uses-new-browser-monitoring-and-injection-techniques

Belton, M. (2018, May 30). Backswap trojan-How to remove it from infected hosts. Retrieved from https://securityboulevard.com/2018/05/backswap-trojan-how-to-remove-it-from-infected-hosts/

Cimpanu, C. (2018, May 25). BackSwap banking trojan uses never-before-seen techniques. Retrieved from https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/backswap-banking-trojan-uses-never-before-seen-techniques/

Enigma Software. (n.d.). Backswap banking trojan. Retrieved from https://www.enigmasoftware.com/backswapbankingtrojan-removal/

Zorz, Z. (2018, May 29). BackSwap trojan exploits standard browser features to empty bank accounts. Retrieved from https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2018/05/29/backswap-trojan/

Monday, September 10, 2018

Yet more malware for the Android!

Overall, there are two primary smartphone forms-the iPhone and Android. Of the two, the Android phones have been targeted at a much greater rate. Yet another example of this target shift has recently been noted. This new Android phone malware is termed MysteryBot.
Targeted
In this case, the targets were the Android 7.X and Android 8.X (Nougat and Oreo). This malware tricks the user into installing the malware, pretending to be Adobe Flash Player. The method for the payload being uploaded into the device has yet to be published.
Function
MysteryBot is still in process of being developed. This has been detected in the wild, but not widely experienced. This malware sample is related to a previously noted and successful malware, LokiBot.
MysteryBot works as a banking trojan, keylogger, and mobile ransomware, all in one malware package. These, unfortunately far from the target, are not all the functionalities experienced.
MysteryBot was coded to send data back to the same command & control (C&C) server as the LokiBot malware. This, among other attributes, indicate these are from the same malware creators.
For this malware, the nuance for the banking trojan was creative. On the targeted and compromised devices, the unknowing user sees their “screen”, which is an overlay placed there by the malware application. The malware monitors the activity, waiting for the user to try and log into their bank. The screen is for the user’s bank login screen. With earlier versions, the malware did not work exceptionally well. MysteryBot improved on this, evidencing learning from prior code errors. With this malware version, the overlay screens are presented at the appropriate time. This is done by manipulating the Android PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS permission. This is available through the Accessibility Service/Usage Access. The factor that makes this work so well is the user provides the permissions.
The nuance goes beyond this. The keylogger’s unique-ness records the location of where the user touched the screen. The malware attempted to guess what the user is typing based on this location using the FLAG_SECURE setting. Although new, this is still under development.
This also has a ransomware component. This was coded to lock the user’s files or external storage devices. This does not encrypt the files but locks them. The files, directories, and subdirectories are locked in a password-protected ZIP archive. This malware module was not coded well. The ZIP archive password was only eight characters long. The password and infected device ID are then forwarded to a remote control panel (Myster_Locker). The ID number is between 0 and 9999. With this, there is no verification of pre-existing IDs. Once the files are locked, MysteryBot provides a message to the user, stating the device is blocked due to the device accessing pornographic videos.
To unlock the device, the user is directed to an email address in Russia. To make matters worse, the malware was able to access the user’s phonebook details, copy text messages, manage call forwarding, and delete contact details from the device. To make this even worse, the malware may make or stop phone calls, copy, delete, and send SMS messages, access and steal emails, and allow unauthorized remote access.
Removal
All is not lost. To remove this, the user needs to open the device in safe mode, install Reimage or Anti-malware, and scan their full system.
Looking Forward
As noted, the malware enters the user’s system after what they believe is an Adobe Flash Player. In moving forward and learning from other’s mistakes, user’s should install their applications only from trusted developers, don’t install applications requiring admin rights or other rights which are not necessary, if possible read the T&C, and read other user’s reviews.


Resources
Cimpanu, C. (2018, June 14). New mystery bot android malware packs a banking trojan, keylogger, and ransomware. Retrieved from https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-mysterybot-android-malware-packs-a-banking-trojan-keylogger-and-ransomware/

Chakraborty, S. (2018, June 18). MysteryBot android malware combines banking trojan, ransomware, and keylogger. Retrieved from https://gadgets.ndtv.com/apps/news/mysterybot-android-malware-banking-trojan-ransomware-keylogger-1869351

Hall, G.E. (2018, June 19). MysteryBot virus: How to remove? Retrieved from https://www.2-spyware.com/remove-mysterybot-virus.html

Hashim, a. (2018, June 17). Android mysterybot banking malware is worse than lokibot. Retrieved from https://latesthackingnews.com/2018/06/17/android-mysterybot-banking-malware-is-worse-than-lokibot/

Lilly, P. (2018, June 15). MysteryBot android malware fuses keylogger, ransomware, and banking trojan into toxic hellstew. Retrieved from https://hothardware.com/news/mysterybot-android-malware-fuses-keylogger-ransomware-banking-trojan

Lorenz, N. (2018, June 15). Mystery bot-The android malware that’s keylogger, ransomware, and trojan. Retrieved from https://blog.avira.como/mysterybot-the-android-malware-thats-keylogger-ransomware-and-trojan/ 

Palmer, D. (2018, June 15). This new android malware delivers banking trojan, keylogger and ransomware. Retrieved from https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-new-android-malware-delivers-banking-trojan-keylogger-and-ransomware/ 

Sachdeva, A. (2018, June 18). MysterybBot android malware combines keylogger, ransomware, and banking trojan. Retrieved from https://fossbytes.com/mysterybot-android-malware/