Thursday, September 15, 2016

Jackpotting ATMs: Here it comes Again

            ATMs over the years have been seen throughout the communities at the banks and credit unions. These however are now seen in several forms of retail establishments (convenience stores, grocery stores, malls, etc.) and in the workplace for the convenience of the consumers. The first ATMs were implemented in 1967 at a Barclays Bank branch in London (Kochetova, 2016). With the vast number of these located across the planet, all loaded with money, the attackers have decided to work at breaching these for profit.
History
            The attacks on ATMs are not a new phenomenon. These attempts have been recorded for at least a decade. In 2010 at Black Hat there was a demonstration on the methodology to jackpot on ATM machine. In this instance the demonstrator showed the methods to gain admin privilege and issue the command for it to liberate all of its cash (ATMequipment, 2010).
            Another presentation by Barnaby Jack also at Black Hat first demonstrated how to open an ATM, plug in a USB, and restarting the ATM. This attack was not complex or difficult. A second attack bypassed the authentication process remotely. A rootkit was installed, and the ATM machine was pwned (Dirro, 2010; Zetter, 2010).
            A later attack involved jackpotting ATMs by only using the keypad. This attack was done over 18 months in the Nashville, TN area. The attackers fraudulently collected over $400K in other people’s money. They were caught and will spend a great deal of time at the hospitable jail. With the lure of easy money, this is not unusual.
Recent Attack
            Over the last six years, after the security had improved, the incidents of ATM attacks had decreased to a not significant level. This was mostly done by people just being curious an not breaching the machine.
            That was, until recently. There was a theft of over $2M from ATMs with fraudulent withdrawals in Taiwan. As this had not happened for years, the authorities had no idea of the method it was perpetrated. From the camera recording, it was seen that the thefts were done without a card being inserted into the machine (Ducklin, 2016). At this point, the machine was jackpotted. The people gathering the cash wore masks, making identification exceptionally difficult at best. As the investigation continued, it became known that this was done by at least two Russian nationals. At first glance, it appeared the attackers used malware downloaded by the ATM.
            Further research indicated the parties involved were from Infocube, a security firm located in Russia, and a gang focused on cybercrime, Carbanack (Cluley, 2016). Carbanack is a familiar name in certain circles. They have been accused of fraudulently acquiring over $200M. In other attacks, they have used e-payment systems and installed malware on the infrastructure the ATMS operate on.
            These suspects were located and arrested (Abel, 2016). One was located in northeast Taiwan and two were in Taiwan’s capital of Taipei. There were also 13 others, who had fled the country, who were also implicated. Fortunately over half of the money was recovered. The process used to place the malware on the system for this attack in unknown. This attack on the network (Gray, 2016) will be investigated further.
References
ATMequipment. (2010, August 3). Hantle (formerly Tranos) ATM machines. Retrieved from http://atmequipment.com/News/Technical-Bulletin-Jackpotting-ATM-Machines  
Cluley, G. (2016, July 20). Russian security firm linked to cybercrime gang. Retrieved from https://www.grahamcluley.com/2016/07/russian-security-firm-linked-cybercrime-gang/ 
Dirro, T. (2010, July 28). Remote jackpot: Hacking ATMs. Retrieved from https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/remote-jackpot-hacking-data/  
Ducklin, P. (2006, July 18). Mystery surrounds $2M ATM “jackpotting” attack in Taiwan. Retrieved from https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/07/18/mystery-surrounds-2m-atm-jackpotting-attack-in-taiwen 
Durden, T. (2014, November 16). “ATM jackpotting” exposed-It’s not just the fed that spits out free money. Retrieved from http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014/11-16/atm-jackpotting-exposed-its-not-just-fed-spits-out-free-money  
Gray, P. (2016, July 21). Risky.biz #419—Brian krebs on future of bank cybecrime. Retrieved from http://risky.biz/RB419 
Kochetova, O. (2016, April 26). Malware and non-malware ways for ATM jackpotting. Retrieved from https//:securelist.com/analysis/publications/74533/malware-and-non-malware-ways-for-atm-jackpotting-extended-cut/  
Krebs, B. (2014, October 20). Spike in malware attacks on aging ATMs. Retrieved from http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/10/spike-in-malware-attacks-on-aging-atms/ 
Krebs, B. (2015, January 6). Thieves jackpot ATMs with ‘Black Box’ attack. Retrieved from http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/01/thieves-jackpot-atms-with-black-box-attack
Roger, J. (n.d.). Jackpotting ATM machines courtesy of the jolly roger jackpotting was done rather successfully. Retrieved from http://skepticfiles.org/new/068doc.html 

Wikipedia. (2016, July 15). Security of automated teller machines. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_of_Automated_Teller_Machines
Zetter, K. (2010, July 28). Researcher demonstrates ATM ‘jackpotting’ at black hat conference. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2010/07/atms-jackpotted/


Monday, September 12, 2016

VW: Old Vulnerability Brought to Light...Finally

Cybersecurity continues to be an issue in our environment. This concerns both old and new technology applied commercially and with consumers. Cybersecurity is also applicable to various industries. Recent examples abound in the current news. There has been hospitals recently being the recipient of ransomware and other malware. Granted this was traumatic for the respective hospital as their patient records were encrypted, however the reach goes far beyond this with the issues for the patients. There were also however a number of associated issues with this as any stolen patient records were being sold on the dark web, loss of trust and rapport within the community, the hospital administrator had to decide whether to pay the ransom or not, and analyzing the possible fines for the HIPAA violations. Banks have also been targeted by malware, in the form of phishing and SWIFT involving millions of dollars. Other businesses have been the victim of the executive wire scam.
Cybersecurity is becoming more of an issue. The government is planning more of a focus on this, as shown by the FCC becoming more involved with ensuring businesses apply the appropriate level of security to their enterprise. This has been handled in various cases as of late, with a hotel chain and other entities. One area not addressed at length is vehicle cybersecurity. Two congressmen, Senators markey and Blumenthal from Massachusetts and Connecticut respectively, have requested the FCC focus more on this aspect of our society (Markety, 2016). As of mid-September 2016, the vehicle manufacturers have not been assessed fines for the lack of vehicle cybersecurity, as other industries for their cybersecurity breaches.
Vehicle Vulnerability-Remote Door Control
There are a number of vulnerabilities with vehicles from various sources. These can be internal to the vehicle or from external sources. Specifically for this topic, the subject vehicles have a vulnerability with the unlocking of the doors using a remote or fob. One method to unlock remotely a vehicle a vehicle involved RFID functionality. The issue with this generally is the cryptographic keys tend to be too short (Bono, Green, Stubblefield, Rubin, Juels, & Szydlo, n.d.) As the length is too short, and cracked too easily. The other method involves the key fob.
VW
This year has certainly brought a certain level of notoriety to the VW nameplate. The first significant issue was concerning the misrepresentation of the diesel-emission test results. This proved to be very costly, financially and reputationally. If this was not a sufficiently negative event, there is now another issue regarding a significant vulnerability. This affects millions of VW vehicles manufactured since 1995 (McHugh, 2016; Utermohlen, 2016; Auchard, 2016; McGoogan, 2016; Ross, 2016; Bing, 2016; Abel, 2016; Reuters, 2016; Greenberg, 2016; Brown, 2016). This vulnerability was found in 2012 (Pagliery, 2016). The researchers were ready, willing, and able to publish this in 2013 but were sued by VW to cease the researchers from publishing for two years (Greenberg, 2016; Pagliery, 2016).
Manufacturing Process
In this case, the key fob is involved. This is used as the user pushes the button, the fob communicates to the vehicle and authenticates itself, as the car door(s) unlock, the lights blink, and the user is able to enter the vehicle. This appears to be a relatively simple process.
The manufacturing process itself also appears to be relatively straight-forward process. As the vehicle moves along the line, the equipment is added to the frame and vehicle as it takes the familiar shape. Near the end of the manufacturing line, the key fob for the vehicle is ready for programming. At this point, the application and code are programmed into the vehicle (Intagliata, 2016). This is done for every var. As the fob is coupled to the vehicle, the crypto-algorithm is applied to the code for each car. Years ago, this methodology was fine for that short time period. However after millions of vehicles, or samples to test, the cryptographic measures are not so robust. For the purpose of this discussion, this was the process for the Volkswagen Group for 20 years (Intagliata, 2016).
Hardware
The researchers were able to easily clone the remote keyless communication between the key fob and vehicle. This was done using common equipment (McHugh, 2016) that may be secured by anyone. Specifically this used an RF transceiver made with a Arduino processor, a handful of other basic parts, and a 9 volt battery. Although these cost approximately $40 USD (Abel, 2016; Ross, 2016; Bring, 2016; Greenberg, 2016; McGoogan, 2016). This assisted the researchers to break/decode the crypto-algorithm used to encrypt the communication via analyzing the chips in the VW group vehicles and fobs (Intagliata, 2016). The researchers are not divulging where or how it acquired the crypto key (Davies, 2016; Khandelwal, 2016). Once decrypted, the researcher and attackers are able to put this into a generic fob and unlock the vehicles (Intagliata, 2016). With this in hand, the attackers do not require any damage to the vehicle to steal it (Bing, 2016). Thus, the hardware itself to exploit the vulnerability is relatively simple.
The hardware of this attack uses a radio transmitter to complete the man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack to sniff the communication between the fob and the car (Hopping, 2016; McHugh, 2016). This communication contains a limited amount of data, including the master key code (Ross, 2016). This coupled with the algorithm allows the attacker to reach the goal of unlocking the vehicle. The attack can done up to 300 feet away (Bing, 2016; Greenberg, 2016) or 100 meters (Kan, 2016).
The decryption of the signal and cloning it (McHugh, 2016; Bing, 2016; Courtney, 2016) describes the more basic attack on these vehicles. The more advanced attack, Hitag2, was focussed on the Chevrolet, Renault, and Ford select models (Ross, 2016; Tung, 2016). This version focussed on cracking the rolling code, as this was used with these models, which took merely one to a few minutes to crack (Davies, 2016; Solon, 2016). As this is cracked, the final checksum for this is predictable (Ross, 2016; bing, 2016; Garcia, Oswald, Kasper, & Pavlides, 2016).
Remediation
First, it is notable and disturbing how VW handled this issue. VW stated in their manufacturing process the state of the art security is implemented with their vehicles. This is beneficial to the users. They however noted that there is no 100% guaranty in their vehicle security (Murdoch, 2016). This is a well-accepted generalization for the info sec industry. The issue is with VW stating this, it appears as though this has been fully internalized by VW and they are accepting to secure every aspect. Granted, securing every aspect is not possible due to unknown vulnerabilities, however a fully secure vehicle should be a goal striven towards.
This attack, both versions would explain the stolen vehicle insurance claims when the owner claimed the vehicle was locked (Zorz, 2016).
VW had been aware of the issue for years (Intagliata, 2016; Bing, 2016; Reuters, 2016) since 2012 (Greenberg, 2016). In 2013, the researchers were ready to publish this when VW sued them to stop this publication for two years. The models affected include Ford, Chevrolet, Nissan, and Mitsubishi as these used the same process for the fob as VW. This also affected GM’s Opel and Renault models (McHugh, 2016) and Peugeot (Brown, 2016). Of these,the VW models are the most at risk (Hopping, 2016; Bing, 2016). All of these had the same weak crypto-algorithm in place (Intagliata, 2016).
With recent models, VW has stated the issue has been corrected (Davies, 2016; Utermohlen, 2016; Tragianis, 2016). This has been updated with the unique security keys (Brown, 2016) and the MQB Modular Transverse Matrix (McGoogan, 2016).


References
Abel, R. (2016, August 12). Volkswagon bug: 100M vehicles vulnerable to door unlocking hack. Retrieved from http://www.scmagazineuk.com/researchers-vulnerability-affecting-every-volkswagon-since-1995/article/515616/  
Auchard, E. (2016, August 11). Keyless entry systems on most volkswagens, audis, can be hacked: Researchers. Retrieved from http://theglobeandmail.com/globe-drive/culturetechnology/keless-entry-systems-on-most-volkswagens-audies-can-be-hacked-researchers/article31379613
Bing, C. (2016, August 12). 100 million vehicles are vulnerable to hack that unlocks door. Retrieved from http://fedscoop.com/volkswagon-hack-ford-nissan-fiat-august-2016
Bono, S., Green, M., Stubblefield, A., Rubin, A. Juels, A., & Szydlo, M. (2016). Exploiting RFIDs: Car immobilizers and the exxon mobile speedpass. Retrieved from https://securityevaluators.com/knowledge/case_studies/rfid/  
Brown, B. (2016, August 11). 100 million volkswagen vehicles can be unlocked wirelesslessly by hacker thieves. Retrieved from http://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/remote-key-fobs-vulnerable-vw/
Cockfield, B. (2016, May 3). Volkswagen beetle-The most hackable car. Retrieved form http://hackaday.com/2016/05/03/volkswagen-beetle-the-most-hackable-car/
Courtney, W.S. (2016, August 11). 100 million volkswagen cars threatened by wireless key hack. Retrieved from http://www.thedrive.com/news/4801/100-million-ovlkswagen-cars-threatened-by-wireless-key-hack
Davies. C. (2016, August 11). Volkswagen hack renders millions of car locks useless. Retrieved from http://www.slashgear.com/volswagen-hack-renders-millions-of-car-locks-useless-11451502
Fadilpasic, S. (2016, December 8). Got a volkswagen? You might want to read this one. Retrieved from http://www.itproportal.com/2016/08/12/got-a-volkswagen-you-might-want-to-read-this-one/
Garcia, F.D., Oswald, D., Kasper, T., & Pavlides, P. (2016). Lock it and still lose it-On the (in)security of automotive remote keyless entry systems. Retrieved from https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2010178/Volkswagen-amp-HiTag2-Keyless-Entry-System.pdf
Greenberg, A. (2016, August 10). A new wireless hack can unlock 100 million volkswagens. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2016/08/oh-good-new-hack-can-unlock-100-million-volkswagens/
Hopping, C. (2016, August 14). Keyless car entry systems could be a huge security risk. Retrieved from http://www.itpro.co.uk/hacking/27088/keyless-car-entry-systems-could-be-a-huge-security-risk
Intagliata, C. (2016, August 12). Remote door controls are car security flaw. Retrieved form http://scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode/remote-door-controls-are-car-security-flaw/
Khandelwal, S. (2016, August 11). Car thieves can unlock 100 million volkswagens with a single hack. Retrieved from http://thehackernews.com/2016/08/hack-unlock-car-door.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm+campaign=Feed%3A+TheHackerNews+%28The+Hacker+news+-+Security+Blog%29&_3...
Knight, H. (2016, July 18). Understanding electronic control units (ECUs) in connected automobiles and how they can be hacked. Retrieved from https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/security-essentials/understanding-electronic-control-units-ecus-in-connected-automobiles-and-how-they-can-be-hacked  
Liberatore, S. (2016, August 12). Security experts reveal $40 device that would allow thieves to wirelessly unlock nearly every volkswagen made since 1995. Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3737375/Security-experts-reveal-40-device-allow-thieves-wirelessly-unlock-nearly-Volkswagen-1995.html
Markey, E.J. (2016, August 4). Markey and blumenthal call on the FCC to help improve vehicle cybersecurity and privacy protections. Retrieved from http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/markey-and-blumenthal-call-on-the-fcc-to-hep-improve-vehicle-cybersecurity-and-privacy-protections
McGoogan, C. (2016, August 11). Bought a volkswagen in the last 20 years? It can probably be unlocked by hackers. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/techology/2016/08/11/bought-a-volkswagen-in-the-last-20-years-it-can-be-probably-be-unlo/
McHugh, D. (2016, August 12). Security experts: Remotes are hackable on many vehicles. Retrieved from http://napavalleyregister.com/news/world/security-experts-remotes-are-hackable-on-many-vehciles/article_3e2c5da6-16ad-532a-b56f-7bdc7de2ae94.html
Murdoch, J. (2016, August 12). Volkswagen security vulnerability leaves 100 million cars wide open to wireless key hacking. Retrieved form http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/volkswagen-security-vulnerability-leaves-100-million-cars-wide-open-wirless-key-hacking-1575624
Pagliery, J. (2016, August 14). Volkswagen hid a car hacking flaw for two years. Retrieved from http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/14/techlogy/volkswagen-car-hacking/index.html
Reuters. (2016, August 11). Millions of vw’s cars can be hacked with a cheap device, experts show. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/millions-vw-s-cars-can-be-hacked-cheap-device-experts-u628271
Solon, O. (2015, August 14). VW has spent two years trying to hide a big security flaw. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-14/vw-has-spent-two-years-trying-to-hide-a-big-security-flaw
Tragianis, N. (2016, August 11). Researchers find security flaw with vws built since 1995. Retrieved from http://driving.ca/volkswagen/auto-news/news/researchers-find-security-flaw-with-vws-built-since-1995
Tung, L. (2016, August 11). Millions of vw cars at risk: Wireless hack lets crooks clone volkswagen keys. Retrieved from http://www.zdnet.com/article/millions-of-vw-cars-at-risk-wireless-hack-lets-crooks-clone-volkswagen-keys-at-100m/
Utemohlen, K. (2016, August 11). Millions of vw cars at risk of unlocking hack. Retrieved from http://investorplace.com/2016/08/vw-hacked/#.V6zZhPkrK00
Zorz, Z. (2016, August 11). Hundreds of millions of cars can be easily unlocked by attackers. Retrieved from https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2016/08/11/cars-easily-unlocked-attackers/

Vehicle Hacking: Beyond Proof of Concept & Applied!

            In the overall scheme of our reality, vehicle hacking is relatively a new area of research. This timeline was in place due to advances in computer technology. One of these was placed in the vehicle and as began to be used more throughout the vehicle, this became more of a target for research and criminal activities.
The first significant manifestation was the infamous Jeep hack with Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek (Weise, 2016). This was widely publicized and was a sensation on YouTube. With this they were able to stop a car and disable its brakes when the vehicle was moving under 5 mph. After further research and application of effort, these two were able to take control of their steering and brakes while the vehicle would be driving up to 30 mph. Both of these attacks have the ability to create a bit of chaos for the driver whenever the attackers would want.
Since the initial published attack, this has garnered much more attention from academics, researchers looking for topics, law enforcement, and others. This focus has been on all aspects of the vehicle, including but not limited to the tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS), key fobs, communication to and from the vehicle, among other points.
Application
            As vehicle security has been published in peer-reviewed journals, newspapers, magazines, television, and YouTube, a portion of the audience does not have the most altruistic intentions. A case in point, two men were arrested in Houston for stealing over 100 cars (Associated Press, 2016; Krisher, 2016). This was not part of a movie script but the workings of a criminal venture. The two criminals used only a laptop, a blank key fob, and software to commit the crime (Goudie, 2016).
            These two were able to reprogram the vehicle’s security system with these simple tools. They were able to acquire a database with access codes used to program the key fobs for certain FCA vehicles. These codes are not generic across all lines of business, but are specific. These codes are used to program the fob for each vehicle (Graczyk & Krisher, 2016).
            For the specific attack, they gained access to the vehicle’s engine compartment and cut the wires to the alarm system. From this point they programmed a fob for the vehicle using the VIN and code from the database. The entirety of the attack took six minutes (VOA News, 2016). The two deviants would then steal the car with ease.
            This attack is solely possible due to the computers being more advanced and connected in the vehicle. The computers had the ability to better the user experience, which is a benefit. These are also used as a marketing tool as it has become expected from the vehicles. As these are important, the implementation of security is likewise pertinent.
Target
            There are under a dozen significant vehicle manufacturers across the globe. From these, there are hundreds of different distinct models to choose from over the last decade. The thieves chose the new Jeep and Dodge vehicles (VOA News, 2016; Krisher, 2016). These were chosen for two reasons. The database that was acquired were for these vehicles. Also these vehicles tend to sell for higher prices in Mexico, which is where the vehicles were going to be sold after the theft (Krisher, 2016).
Future
            The increase in use of computers and their connectivity has certainly provided a new avenue to steal vehicles. This incident is not the first, and certainly won’t be the last set of thefts using and the technology connecting the vehicle. The technology has increased the number of known and yet to be known points and vulnerabilities to attack. These can be translated into theft opportunities. With this attack, the criminals only needed very few items. These were completed in the middle of the night. By the time the owners awoke for another productive day in society, their vehicle was long gone in another country and in the process of being sold.
Defenses
            All is not lost. There are actions to use in order to better secure the vehicles. The manufacturers need to provide better defensive measures. At present there are and continue to be several vulnerabilities in the vehicles. To combat this, there cannot be a single point of defense, but there needs to be a defense in depth (VOA News, 2016). The manufacturers have to make it much more difficult to breach the vehicle. The industry best practices need to be applied to the vehicle’s defenses. This should be kept safe much like any network.
            Without this, there will continue to be issues that will grow in frequency and intensity. No one wants to be a victim, however we need to work towards a better solution.
Remediation
            FCA has taken this latest breach in security abundantly in a serious mode. Although the coes are in the wild, FCA is working towards an attempt to limit person’s motivation to secure the database. FCA is threatening criminal and civil actions against anyone providing these codes for the fob keys, codes applicable to the radios, and other anti-theft measures against non-authorized parties (Vellequette, 2016). This is clearly noted and published with the FCA amended terms of use also. FCA had to address this issue directly. With these codes, the person is able to unlock the vehicle doors, which allows the person to steal the vehicle. At this junction, this may be the best course of action.

References

Associated press. (2016, August 7). Cops: Laptops used to reprogram, steal 100 cars. Retrieved from http://www.newsday.com/classifieds/cars/jeep-dodge-cars-stolen-after-laptop-reprogrammed-vehicles-security-system-cops-say-1.12143366
E-Hacking News. (2016, August 5). Hackers stole more than 30 jeeps. Retrieved from http://www.ehackingnews.com/2016/08/hackers-stole-more-than-30-jeeps.html
Goudie, C. (2016, August 4). Computer carjacking risk becomes reality. Retrieved from http://abc7chicago.com/news/computer-carjacking-risk-becomes-reality/1457581/
Graczyk, M., & Krisher, T. (2016, August 5). Police: Laptop used to reprogram, steal more than 100 cars. Retrieved from http://www.heraldonline.com/news/business/article93910927.html
Krishner, A.T. (2016, August 7). Suspected car thieves reset vehicle’s security systems. Retrieved from http://www.pressherald.com/2016/08/05/police-texas-car-theft-suspects-reset-vehicle-security-systems/
Vellequette, L.P. (2016, August 27). FCA moves to lock down security codes. Retrieved from http://www.autonews.com/article/20160827/OEM/308299963/fca-moves-to-lock-down-security-codes  
VOA News. (2016, August 7). Hackers use computer to steal cars. Retrieved from http://www.voanews.com/content/us-car-thefts/3454284.html
Weise, E. (2016, August 4). Car hackers say they’ve hijacked jeep brakes. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/08/04/car-jackers-say-theyve-hijacked-jeep-brakes-88180342


Wednesday, August 3, 2016

Cici's Pizza Breach-Smells Like an Issue

                The pizza is one of the more iconic foods in this culture. Consumers have positive thoughts with regard to indulging in the meal. What is not welcomed is the occasional issue with the credit card system. This unfortunately occurred with the Ci Ci’s recent breach. There were over 130 locations affected (Bisson, 2016; Pleasant, 2016; Kan, 2016; Copeland, 2016). Specifically there were problems noted with the POS system at these locations. The investigation started in March 2016 (Northrup, 2016). The noise regarding this issue was from several locations (Bisson, 2016) and curiously enough six financial institutions (NAFCU, 2016; Dissent, 2016).

                The locations had found the POS systems appeared to be malfunctioning. This acted as the respective site’s red flag that something was not quite right. From the financial intermediary sources, they noticed the increase in fraud in their selected client accounts (NAFCU, 2016). As the numbers of feared cases began to increase, the affected parties researched the issue and contacted Ci Ci’s. The issue revolved around malware that had been placed on the affected systems. A third party was contracted to review the sites and remediated the issues. The sites affected were widespread. These were located in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin (Northrup, 2016).

                This is not a new phenomenon. Other recent targets of this nefarious activity were Wendy’s, Dairy Queen, Buffalo Wild Wings, Taco Time, and Wingstop. These all together also were across different sized restaurants (national chains and local) and type of food.

Attack
                This was noted as a problem in early March 2016 when the POS systems were not working well (Krebs, 2016). After it became readily apparent that there was an issue, more of an investigation ensued. There was indeed a breach of the POS system (Secureworld, 2016). The remainder of the sites was analyzed for the presence of malware by 403 Labs (Krebs, 2016). The vendor determined the breach was initiated in 2015 and the malware was active through the discovery date.

                To gain unauthorized access, a group posed as technical support for Ci Ci’s POS provider, Datapoint (Able, 2016; Guard, 2016). After using the usual social engineering tactics, the attackers gained access and downloaded the malware (Krebs, 2016). Once the malware was on the system, the program was able to capture the credit card data per consumer. This data for the victim’s credit cards was then bundled together and sold to others. The purchasers would then place the data on credit card blanks, embossed these with the correct consumer information, and these were used to purchase higher end products.

Summary
                There continues to be one focus of attack-the user. This continues to be a weak link. The attackers could have taken an abundance of time to perform a full hack of the system (enumeration, google hack, review potential system vulnerabilities, etc.). This may have taken much more time that what was necessary with this simple social engineering attack against a handful number of employees with access the attackers needed. The tactic to best defend against an attack much like this is simply training, more training, and a healthy dose of thoughtfulness.

References
Abel, R. (2016, June 9). Update: Possible POS breach at cici’s pizza. Retrieved from http://www.scmagazine.com/cicis-pizza-may-have-experienced-pos-breach-through-third-party/article/501245/
Bisson, D. (2016, July 20). Cici’s pizza suffers payment card breach at 130+ locations. Retrieved form http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/latest-security-news/cicis-pizza-suffers-payment-card-breach-at-130-locations/
Copeland, M. (2016, July 22). Credit card security breached at local cici’s restaurants. Retrieved from http://www.wacotrib.com/news/business/credit-card-security-breached-at-local-cicis-restaurants/article_c5729531-b48e-5c60-9c56-4db2c58a6575.html
Dissent. (2016, June 4). Banks: Credit card breach at cici’s pizza. Retrieved from https://www.databreaches.net/banks-credit-card-breach-at-Cici-s-pizza/
Guard, B. (2016, June). Suspected data breach at cicis pizza exposes customer payment cards. Retrieved from http://blog.billguard.com/2016/06/apparent-data-breach-cicis-pizza-exposes-customer-payment-cards/
Kan, M. (2016, July 20). Hackers have targeted 130 restaurants at cicis pizza chain. Retrieved from http://www.pcworld.com/article/3098167/hackers-have-targeted-130-restaurants-at-cicis-pizza-chain.html  
Kreb, B. (2016, July 19). Cici’s pizza: Card breach at 130+ locations. Retrieved from https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/07/cicis-pizza-card-breach-at-130-locations/
NAFCU. (2016). Cici’s pizza hit by data breach. Retrieved from https://www.nafcu.org/News/2016_News/June/Krebs_Cici_s_Pizza_hit_by_data_breach/
Northrup, L. (2016, July 20). Eat at cici’s pizza in the last year? Watch your credit card statements. Retrieved from https://consumerist.com/2016/07/20/eat-at-cicis-pizza-in-the-last-year-watch-your=credit-card-statements
Pleasant, R. (2016, July 20). Cici’s pizza data breach serves a slice of credit card theft. Retrieved from http://siliconangle.com/blog/2016/07/20/cicis-pizza-serves-a-slice-of-credit-card-theft/


Breach Response



Years ago, a business could plan to secure their enterprises. The IT department would harden the system and in most cases there would be a reasonable assurance the enterprises was relatively safe. Things have changed as technology has improved. This improvement has come at a price. The speed of advancement has not been the easiest environment to apply security in. This lack of applied security has promoted several issues. This has been noted in many breaches. This has clearly only grown in importance as the breaches the breaches are more common and the businesses provide more data to steal.

In the case of a breach, the first act is that the alleged breach must be verified to have occurred. If one did occur, the business needs to analyze what was affected. Not all breaches are reportable. If there happens to be data involved of a consumer confidential nature, there would need to be a notification. The trigger point would be the data having social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, financial account numbers, passwords, and other personally identifying information.

The business also may be required to notify the affected parties with in a specific amount of time. This period varies on the state and federal level, depending on the subject matter and jurisdiction.  Many states instead of putting a number of this period, simply state this have to be done with a few “reasonable” time period. This generally is accepted as 45 days. If there is HIPAA information involved, there may be a timeline in place for the notification.

Once the timeline is in place and divided on, the notice itself has to be written. This is also dependent on the jurisdiction. Certain states have requirements that have to be met. For instance, Rhode Island has for its notification law six items to be met. There may be a template or form letter to be used.

These events are not going to slow down in occurrence or magnitude. As the attackers have operationalized this as a business, it has proven itself to be a revenue producer, and popular as an attack tool.





Miel, LLC Infosec Managed Services & Consulting
  
810-701-5511

charlesparkerii@gmail.com




It is not about winning or losing, but reorienting yourself to the real problem-managing the risk across the enterprise.

Predictive Analytics Applicable to Info Sec

                Info Sec is an uphill battle daily. The entity with limited resources of staffing, time, and expenses has the duty and responsibility to secure and protect the enterprise and its data. The entity has only a limited number of staff members present, space to have them, and costs associated with having the staff members employed. This limited number of staff members equates to lesser hours being available during the week to work on it. The entity lastly does not have an open checkbook to purchase off of the top shelf security applications, hardware, and scanning tools. All of these can get very costly very quickly. The attackers, on the other hand, on a collective measure have people coding malware, scanning, and actively seeking vulnerabilities. This occurs across the globe. The business, being potentially attacked form anywhere, at any time, by a large number of people and their bots. The CISO of a targeted organization has many sleepless nights.

                One tool that is exceptionally helpful with this is predictive analytics. Previously the businesses would use anti-virus (AV) and log management to analyze a mass amount of data hoping to note this. The predictive analytics has been able to add to the set of tools to assist with the function to provide a greater depth of security.

                One way this is applied is to analyze the probability of an attack occurring. The data set for this involves several factors, including data on the malware being seen for the industry and in general, other data breaches, methods used with these, phishing, and other data. This data coupled with the additional facets of the attackers provide a sign to be used to compare against for the files, traffic appearing in the network, emails and other attack vectors that may be present, helps to provide a better algorithm. 

                In implementing this, the items and network areas to review are much smaller and manageable.


Miel, LLC Infosec Managed Services & Consulting
  
810-701-5511

charlesparkerii@gmail.com




It is not about winning or losing, but reorienting yourself to the real problem-managing the risk across the enterprise.